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The economy needed a
stronger hryvnia 
During the last four years, Ukraine has been
showing a foreign trade and current
account surplus. In other words, the volume
of imported goods and services coming into
the country over this period was less than
the volume of exports leaving it. In 2004,
the trade surplus stood at US $3.676bn,
which was 5.6% of GDP. At US $6.838bn,
the current account surplus was even
higher, equivalent to 10.5% of GDP. This
means that 10% of the country’s economic
output was not consumed but converted
into foreign currency. 
This foreign currency was purchased by the
National Bank of Ukraine to artificially
support the undervalued hryvnia. As a
result, NBU forex reserves grew and there
was an ongoing influx of hryvnia to the
economy that exporters received in
exchange for foreign currency purchased by
the National Bank. However, this surplus
hryvnia is not supported by a
commensurate increase in consumer goods.
A growing money mass without a related
increase in output always leads to inflation. 
An economy seeks balance. If the nominal
exchange rate is maintained artificially, the
economy adjusts the real exchange rate
through a commensurate inflation5driven
depreciation of the currency. Thus, it is
possible to claim that the high 12.4%
inflation in 2004 was, at least in part, the
result of an undervalued hryvnia exchange
rate against the US dollar after prices for
metal products—the key source of export
revenues—climbed sharply in 2003. The
problem with importing inflation and an
unbalanced exchange rate is not a
phenomenon unique to Ukraine’s economy.
Russia and Kazakhstan also posted much
higher inflation than had been projected,
due to growing global oil prices. 
Pegging to the US dollar, which has been
allowed to depreciate steadily against the
euro in recent years in order to somehow
improve the US balance of payments, has
led to growing inflationary trends. The
World Bank in its 2005 Global Development
Finance Report points to the fact that the
shrinking of the US dollar against other
global currencies is the most significant
risk for developing economies, as they keep
a considerable portion of their foreign
currency reserves in dollar5denominated
liabilities. At the same time, the value of
the dollar measured in the majority of
global currencies—including the currencies
of all FSU and CEE countries—has been
declining steadily over the past two years.
This trend will likely continue. 
The NBU approach to
appreciation was appropriate
The steep shift in the exchange rate gave
rise to many critical comments. While the
overall move towards appreciation is
appropriate, a steep shift in the exchange
rate could lead to substantial losses and
general destabilization. Because Ukrainians
are actually acclimatized to times of
relatively high inflation accompanied by a
stable nominal exchange rate does not
mean that this is normal, let alone the only
possible alternative, in the global economy.
Over the last two years, the National Bank
kept sacrificing internal hryvnia stability
for the sake of external stability.
However, it should be pointed out that the
recent change was actually not that
dramatic—only 5%. Historically, in the
majority of cases where there has been a
successful attack by forex speculators, the
exchange rate shifted much more. When
financier George Soros attacked the pound
sterling on 16 September 1992, the total
depreciation was 12%. In Mexico, the peso
fell 36% in December 1994. The daily
fluctuation of the EUR/USD exchange rate
has been as much as 1.5%.
The question is, could the NBU have
introduced a more gradual appreciation of
the hryvnia and what might the impact
have been? The 2005 State Budget Law
stipulates that the UAH/USD exchange rate
should stand at UAH 5.10/USD 1 by year5
end. The law sets no exchange rate corridor
for the middle of the year. 
To let the hryvnia appreciate gradually and
steadily throughout the year is not
appropriate to the real situation. Firstly,
Ukrainian exports and imports, as well as
other factors affecting forex demand and
supply, have significant seasonal
fluctuations. The first half of the year
generally sees foreign currency inflows,
while in fall forex demand often grows and
supply declines. Making the hryvnia weak in
spring and strong in fall will likely lead to
even greater volatility on the market.
Furthermore, when the exchange rate
changes are set in advance, it becomes
possible to make money just by purchasing
the currency that is about to be changed at
the beginning of the period and selling it at
the end of the period, earning a profit on
the difference. This creates even greater
demand/supply fluctuations. In this
instance, the role of the central bank, whom
the Budget law rather than market
mechanisms dictate the rules for setting
the exchange rate, is completely
neutralized. 
An accelerated but not immediate
appreciation of the hryvnia in about 
30 days is acceptable as well. If the
appreciation were slow, but real, it would
have led to an even more significant rush
on the forex market. If everybody can see
that the NBU is appreciating the hryvnia
exchange rate by 0.5 kopiyka per day over
the course of a week, many banks will try to
temporarily convert dollars into hryvnia. As
The National Bank’s steps to make the hryvnia stronger in late April 2005 were
brought about by the laws of the market. The ground for such an appreciation
was laid by inflationary processes partly stimulated by a major forex influx
from Ukrainian export operations and the general global trend towards a
weaker US dollar—to which the hryvnia has been pegged for a long time.
According to ICPS economists, the sudden approach chosen by the NBU was
more appropriate than a gradual strengthening towards the UAH 5.10/USD 1
rate written into the 2005 State Budget. Indeed, there are signs that Ukraine
could soon expect another jump in the exchange rate
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in the previous case, this will considerably
increase fluctuations on the forex market
and, once again, make it possible to profit
without any risk at the expense of the
central bank, which will sell dollars high
and buy low.
Thus, only an immediate appreciation of the
hryvnia makes it possible to reduce the
foreign trade imbalance without
unbalancing the forex market. The fact that
a minimum number of people knew about
this scheduled appreciation is not to a
mistake on the part of the central bank, but
to its credit. When there is a chance to earn
2.7% just by selling and buying foreign
currency during a single day, there is a great
temptation to sell this information. So the
main way to fight corruption is to simply
avoid creating opportunities or conditions
for corrupt actions. 
The hryvnia should continue
to grow stronger 
Despite the stabilization of the hryvnia and
assurances from the Government and the
NBU that they will maintain the exchange
rate at UAH 5.05/USD 1, it is very likely that
the hryvnia will appreciate further in
June–July 2005. Meanwhile, trade volumes
on the Ukrainian Interbank Currency
Exchange (UICE) remained nearly flat after
20 April 2005, when the hryvnia
appreciated, although they are still 50%
higher than during the same period of
2004. This trend continued until late May.
In part, this was due to a certain inertia in
the economy and the fact that it is
impossible to radically change the flow of
foreign trade. However, both NBU
specialists and western experts are
convinced that real appreciation will
continue. Further nominal appreciation,
albeit not as high as in April, is also
possible.
For additional information, contact Oleksandr
Zholud by telephone at (380*44) 272*1050
or via e*mail at ozholud@icps.kiev.ua. 
In autumn 2002, a new centre5right
government came to power in Slovakia. 
At that time, the tax system was generally
considered unsustainable, overly convoluted
and changeable, with ever more exemptions
and special rates that distorted the business
environment. Tax reform became one of the
most important initiatives of the new
government. The Policy Statement of this
new government undertook only to “reduce
income tax rates and to analyze the
possibility of introducing a flat tax.” In fact,
the reform undertaken by Finance Minister
Ivan Miklos not only introduced a now5
famous flat tax, but actually went far beyond
the original objectives. 
The new tax system came into effect in
January 2004. The goal was to create a
simple, fair and business5friendly system.
This as achieved by:
1. Shifting the tax burden from direct to
indirect taxes, that is, taxing consumption
rather than production. This is expected to
provide more incentive to work. Moreover, in
an era of globalization and increasing labor
mobility, the collection of direct taxes
becomes more difficult to control. Compared
to indirect taxes, it is easier for taxpayers to
evade direct ones. As a result, the relatively
high direct taxes were harming the country’s
fiscal position and competitiveness: people
were fleeing to the shadow economy or to
countries with lower direct taxes. The shift
towards indirect taxes is expected to greatly
reduce tax evasion. The anticipated negative
impact of higher indirect taxes on price
levels and household consumption costs
proved unfounded. Household consumption
grew a strong 3.5% in 2004 compared to the
2.0% economists had expected.
2. Eliminating all exceptions, exemptions
and special regimes. Business survey after
business survey quoted the country’s
excessively complicated tax system and its
frequent changes as one of the key barriers
to business. The old system included 90
exceptions, 19 sources of untaxed income, 
66 tax5exempt items, and 37 items with
individualized tax rates. Reform virtually
abolished all of these, making the Slovak tax
system much simpler and transparent. It
eliminated the many opportunities to fiddle
accounting in order to pay lower tax rates.
3. Introducing a flat tax on personal
income. Unlike progressive taxes, a flat tax
on personal income does not restrict
economic incentives. As the new system
encourages greater effort regardless of
income level, it is expected to increase
productivity.
4. Eliminating tax instruments used for
nonfiscal purposes. Many such instruments
are intended to fulfill social policy
objectives. However, taxes generally address
everybody and not only those in need. Thus,
they have little to do with collective
responsibility. Reform in Slovakia was
intended to clearly distinguishing social
responsibility by replacing virtually all such
instruments with targeted assistance. 
Tax reform was accompanied by welfare
reform aimed at: (1) curbing abuse of social
benefits; (2) carefully targeting social
assistance to those really in need; and 
(3) maintaining incentives to work.
5. Eliminating double taxation of income.
To assure that taxes were fair and simple, the
Slovak Finance Ministry decided to tax all
types and amounts of income equally. In
looking for the optimal rate, the government
decided to apply the same 19% rate to
personal income tax, corporate income tax,
and value5added tax (VAT).
Peter Golias, Institute for Economic and
Social Reforms and Robert Kicina, Business
Alliance of Slovakia.
More information on tax reform in Slovakia, as
well as on reforms to the country’s pension and
social security systems, healthcare, business
environment, and public administration, can be
found in a new publication called “Recent
Economic Reform Experience from Central
Europe: Inspirations and suggestions for
Ukraine.” The publication was released as part
of a joint project implemented by ICPS and
INEKO to transfer Visegrad Group reform know*
how to Ukraine. Financing was provided by the
Slovak Development Agency (SlovakAid),
PosAm and IPEC. 
An electronic copy of this publication can be
found in the ICPS internet library at 
http://www.icps.kiev.ua/eng/library.html?1.
Printed copies can be delivered to any address
in Ukraine.  To get a copy, send an A4
envelope with your return address and postal
stamps worth UAH 1.20 to Svitlana Borenko at 
vul. Pymonenka 13A, Kyiv, Ukraine 04050 
(ICPS) before 15 June 2005.
The most obvious outcome of Slovak tax reform is the country’s increased
attractiveness to foreign investors. The year after these reforms, FDI grew 47%,
while the number of new jobs created by such investments jumped by 69%.
Investors choose Slovakia because of its favorable business environment and tax
system, developed infrastructure, cheap and skilled workforce, and generous
state assistance. The transfer of Slovak economic reform know4how to Ukraine is
the subject of a new publication currently available through ICPS free of charge
Tax reform took Slovakia from basket case
to European model
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